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Abstract
Grandparents are regular providers of free child care. Similar to any other form
of child care, availability of grandparent-provided child care affects fertility and la-
bor market decisions of women positively. We find that women in Germany, residing
close to parents or in-laws are more likely to have children and that as mothers they
are more likely to hold a regular part-or fulltime job. However, different from any
other type of child care, for individuals to enjoy grandparent-provided child care
on a regular basis, residence choices must coincide with those of parents or in-laws.
Thus while living close provides access to free child care, it imposes costly spatial re-
strictions. We find that hourly wages of mothers residing close to parents or in-laws
are lower compared to those residing further away, and having relatives taking care
of ones’ children increases the probability of having to commute. We build a gen-
eral equilibrium model of residence choice, fertility decisions, and female labor force
participation that can account for the relationships between grandparent-provided
child care, fertility and female labor market outcomes. We simulate our model to
analyze how women’s decisions on residence, fertility, and labor force participation
change under distinct scenarios regarding availability of grandparent-provided child
care and different family policies.
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1 Introduction
Grandparents are an important source of child care. According to data from the 2nd
wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), between 23%
(Denmark) and 70% (Italy) of grandparents take care of their grandchildren age ten or
younger on a daily or weekly basis. In the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland more
than 40% of grandparents take care of their small grandchildren each week, while in Italy,
Greece, and Poland more than 40% of grandparents provide daily care for grandchildren
age ten or younger (see Figure 1.1).1 The availability of child care and especially cheap or
even costless child care has important effects on fertility and mothers’ labor force partic-
ipation. This is important, because while female labor force participation has increased
tremendously over the last decades, mothers are still participating significantly less than
other women.2
Figure 1.1: Grandparent-Provided Care for Children ≤ 10 years
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Data: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), 2nd wave.
1In the US, 22.7% of children under 5 years are regularly cared for by their grandparents (Overturf
Johnson [2005]).
2Considering OECD countries, the average difference in labor force participation rates for women and
mothers (of children age 3 or younger) is around 10 (20) percentage points. Scandinavian countries are
an exception where labor force participation rates of mothers are equal to or even higher compared to
those of women in general, OECD [2008].
There exists an extensive empirical literature that has studied the link between female
labor force participation and child care. Many papers propose a joint analysis of the effect
of child care costs on fertility and labor force participation. For Italy, Del Boca [2002]
shows that both the availability of child care and the possibility of part time work in-
crease labor force participation and fertility. Blau and Robins [1989] establish a similar
pattern for the US. Within the context of already high female labor force participation
rates in Sweden, Mo¨rck et al [2009] is one of the few papers that focuses exclusively on the
positive effect of lower child care costs on fertility. In a literature summary, Del Boca and
Viuri [2007] point out that most studies find that high child care costs deter female labor
supply, while availability of child care has a positive effect on labor force participation by
mothers. Thus these findings suggest that the main barrier that mothers face at the time
of working is to obtain affordable child care.3
In this sense, free grandparent-provided child care seems to be the perfect solution for
working mothers. However, in order to enjoy grandparent-provided child care on a regular
basis, residence choices of adult children and elderly parents have to coincide. Data from
the 2nd wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) shows
that the frequency of grandparent-provided child care is clearly linked to the geographical
distance between caregivers and caretakers. Figure 1.2 displays the geographical distance
between grandparents and their small grandchildren (age 10 and younger) together with
the frequency of care provided, for Italy, Spain, Germany, and Denmark. As already
suggested in Figure 1.1, frequency of care varies strongly across the four selected coun-
tries, with Italian and Spanish grandparents clearly providing child care more frequently
than German or Danish grandparents. However, similarly across all countries, those who
provide care more frequently tend to live close by.4
Hence, while grandparent-provided child care may induce positive effects on fertility and
mothers’ labor force participation, different from any other type of child care, it imposes
spatial restrictions that might affect female labor market outcomes negatively. In this pa-
per we document benefits and costs of grandparent-provided child care. Looking at data
from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) we find that women residing close to
parents or in-laws are more likely to have children and as mothers they are more likely
to hold a regular full-or part time job. However, their wages are lower and they are more
likely to commute. Given strong interdependencies of decisions regarding residence, fertil-
ity, child care arrangements, and female labor force participation, our empirical analysis
3For instance, for a US family living below the poverty line, child care costs amount to 30% of income
(US Census Bureau [2011]).
4The same pattern can be observed across the rest of the countries included in the SHARE data set;
see Figures A-1-A-3 of the Appendix.
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Figure 1.2: Frequency of Care and Distance to Closest Grandchild Age 10 and Younger
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Data: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), 2nd wave.
faces various endogeneity problems. Using proximity between adult children and their
parents as an indirect measure for grandparent-provided child care, we address the in-
terdependency of child care arrangements and female labor force participation and we
also run individual fixed effect regressions to account for the fact that residence choices
might be related to an individuals’ unobservable characteristics that also determine their
labor force participation choice. However, certain caveats remain and we cannot claim
to establish causal relationships between geographical proximity and fertility or labor
market outcomes. Thus, to be able to better disentangle individuals’ decisions, we then
build a general equilibrium model of residence choice, fertility decisions, and female labor
force participation that can account for the relationships between grandparent-provided
child care, fertility and female labor market outcomes. We simulate our model to analyze
how women’s decisions on residence, fertility, and labor force participation change under
distinct scenarios regarding availability of grandparent-provided child care and different
family policies.
The current paper thus contributes to the literature by being the first paper, to the best of
our knowledge, that explicitly incorporates spatial restrictions imposed by grandparent-
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provided child care into a general equilibrium model of fertility and labor force participa-
tion decisions. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is also the first one to document
both costs and benefits of the geographical proximity between parents and adult chil-
dren, a necessary condition for frequent grandparent-provided child care. The existing
literature, on the contrary, has solely highlighted the positive implications of geograph-
ical proximity between parents and adult children. Studying fertility intentions rather
than outcomes, Raymo et al [2010] find that Italian and Japanese women living close
to their parents have higher fertility intentions. Holdswoth and Dale [2009] study labor
force participation of mothers in Spain and Britain and estimate that for Spanish women
whose parents live in the same town (’municipio’) the probability of being in employment
is 1.24 times higher than for those who do not live close to their parents. For the US,
Compton and Pollak [2011] find that married women with small children living close to
mothers and mothers-in-law have a 10 percentage point higher probability to be in em-
ployment compared to those living further away. The authors argue that proximity is a
good instrument for child care arrangements as the positive effect of proximity on labor
force participation does not extend to groups for which grandparent-provided child care
is not a determinant for their labor supply like men, unmarried women without children,
or those with sick mothers or sick mothers-in-law.5 Similarly, the positive and significant
effect of proximity to parents on labor force participation found in the current paper only
holds for mothers and does not extend neither to men nor to single childless women.
Our paper is also related to the literature on intergenerational time transfers. The ma-
jority of this literature focuses on time transfers in terms of care from children to el-
derly parents. One interesting paper that also incorporates residence choices is Konrad
et al [2002]. The authors develop a game theoretical model of strategic choice of resi-
dence among siblings who try to avoid having to take care of elderly parents. Looking
at German data, they find support for their model’s predictions of older siblings locating
further away from their parents than younger siblings. With a similar approach in mind,
Stern [1995] estimates care choices of elderly parents together with location decisions of
children. His work is closely related to the current paper as he also takes into account
how the child’s location decision affects his or her work decision. Apart from the afore-
mentioned paper by Compton and Pollak [2011], some of the few empirical works that
consider time transfers from parents to children in form of grandparent-provided child
care is Dimova and Wolff [2011]. The authors use data from the Survey of Health, Ageing
and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) to estimate a simultaneous equation model of labor
supply, grandparent-provided child care, and financial transfers and find a positive effect
5Furthermore, and by using a sample of military wives, whose residence is determined by their hus-
bands’ being stationed in a certain base, the authors are also able to address the additional endogenity
problem of residence choice.
4
of grandparent-provided child care on the extensive margin of female labor force partic-
ipation but no effect along the intensive margin. For Italy, Arpino et al [2010] find that
grandparent-provided child care, instrumented by grandparents being alive, increases, in
particular labor force participation of low educated mothers of young children.
Our paper is also part of the literature that uses general equilibrium models to assess
how different public policies interact with family decisions.6 Closely related is Cardia and
Ng [2003] who different from the current paper, explicitly incorporate grandparents’ deci-
sions into a general equilibrium model for grandparent-provided child care. The authors
suggest that subsidizing grandparents’ time to be the most effective policy in terms of
output and capital accumulation. However, the authors do not consider the spatial re-
strictions and potential costs in terms of labor market outcomes implied by grandparent-
provided child care, something we take into account in the current paper. Other related
works are Greenwood et al [2000] who investigate the effect of the rise in the generosity
of welfare payments on the rising incidence of single motherhood or Garc´ıa-Mora´n [2010]
who evaluates the effect of child care subsidies on female labor force participation, fertility,
and children’s educational outcomes and finds that child care subsidies promote employ-
ment, fertility and education, especially for children in single parent households. Erosa et
al [2010] develop a model of fertility choice and labor market decisions to account for the
observed gender differences in job attachment, employment, and earnings. The authors
argue that having this framework is important for the evaluation of family policies. Also
related to this paper are the works by Bick [2010] and Mendez [2008]. Within a life cycle
model, the former analyzes data for Germany and concludes that informal child care (by
relatives) plays an important role given that mothers’ labor force participation exceeds
child care enrollment for children up to 2 years. However, different from the current pa-
per the author does not model relative-provided child care nor does he take into account
the spatial restrictions that it imposes. The paper by Mendez [2008] on the other hand
attempts to account for differences in geographical mobility and female labor force par-
ticipation across European countries. Similar to the current paper, the author provides a
model of residence choice, fertility, and female labor force participation. However different
from the current paper, regions in his model only differ in terms of child care arrange-
ments and hence there is no individual cost associated to living close to parents or in-laws.
Our aim is similar to these papers, as within a general equilibrium framework that ex-
plicitly incorporates the spatial restrictions imposed by grandparent-provided child care,
we assess distinct scenarios regarding availability of grandparent-provided child care and
different family policies, and we analyze how women’s decisions regarding residence, fer-
6See Attanasio et al [2010] or Guner and Knowles [2009] among others.
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tility, and labor force participation change.7 The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. The next section presents our empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the general
equilibrium model. Section 4 describes our calibration strategy and Section 5 presents the
results of the model. In Section 6 we describe the mechanisms at work in greater detail
and we perform two counterfactual experiments in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Empirical Analysis
For our empirical analysis, we consider data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP). The GSOEP is an annual household survey that has been carried out since
1984. The first sample in 1984 included 5,921 households with 16,205 individuals (76%
adults, 24% children) of which 44% still remained in the sample in 2004, after 20 years.
In addition, new samples for refreshment of the data and for specifically targeting certain
groups of the population (East Germans, foreigners, high-income individuals) were added
in 1990, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000, and 2002. The GSOEP provides extensive information
on individuals’ labor market participation, marital and family status, wages, education,
the size of the town they live in etc.8 For our analysis we only consider women age 25 to
50 living in Germany. We exclude those born outside of Germany, given that for these
individuals both key variables of our analysis, (i) availability of child care by relatives and
(ii) residence relative to parents, might be determined by very different aspects compared
to individuals who were born in Germany. Given stark differences in mothers’ labor force
participation rates between East and West Germany, we introduce dummy variables to
distinguish between individuals living in East and West Germany.9 To account for possi-
ble cultural differences, we also distinguish among those of German nationality and those
of other nationalities. We define three levels of education following the International Stan-
dard Classification of Education (ISCED 1997) designed by the UNESCO[1997]. These
levels correspond to (i) primary education (ISCED levels 0 and 1), (ii) secondary education
(ISCED levels 2, 3, and 4 ), and (iii) tertiary education (ISCED levels 5 and 6). Town sizes
are grouped into small communities (up to 20.000 inhabitants), medium-sized communi-
ties (20.000-100.000 inhabitants), and large communities (more than 100.000 inhabitants).
7However, for the sake of tractability we abstain from several features present in the papers mentioned,
such as a marriage market or employers’ demand for labor.
8For more details on the GSOEP and its development, see SOEP [2005].
9Labor force participation rates for East German mothers of small children (0-3 years) have tradition-
ally been very high and even today they continue to be around 15 percentage points higher than rates
for West German mothers (Bundesministerium fu¨r Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend [2005].) In our
first sample, labor force participation rates for mothers are 64% and 47% respectively in East and West
Germany.
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For our empirical analysis we make use of two alternative ways of measuring the effect of
grandparent-provided child care. The first one is an indirect measure that consists of the
variables ’where does mother live’ and ’where does father live’. However, only during four
waves of the survey (1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006) were survey participants asked to cate-
gorize their parents’ relative residence as in: i)the same house, ii)the same neighborhood,
iii)the same town, iv)another town but within one hour by car, v)further away, or vi)in a
foreign country. Thus, for our analysis we use an unbalanced sample of individuals with
information on the relative residence of parents or in-laws and we pool observations from
these four waves.10 We construct a dummy variable “parents or in-laws close” that takes
on value one for individuals whose mother, father, or in-law lives in the same neighbor-
hood or town and another dummy variable “parents or in-laws far” for individuals who
live more than one hour or further away from their parents or in-laws. For individuals
who live in the same house as their parents or in-laws we construct a different dummy
variable “parents or in-laws in same house”, given that this particular form of co-residence
often arises because young individuals still live at home or due to the need for intensive
care of parents and in most cases it represents a temporary living arrangement.
Our second measure is a more direct one and uses the variable ’regular child care by rel-
atives’. While this includes child care by any relative, grandparent-provided child care is
the most common form of relative-provided child care and even for child care by relatives
other than grandparents similar spatial restrictions apply. The variable ’regular child
care by relatives’, on the other hand is only available for the waves: 1997, 1999, 2000,
2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006. For our analysis we focus on individuals with children
age three and younger and again we pool data from the available waves. We consider
mothers of children age three and younger, given that in Germany availability of public
or publicly subsidized nursery for children of age three and older is almost guaranteed,
while for those younger very few places are available.11 Hence child care by relatives is
particularly important for mothers of children age three and younger. We thus construct
a dummy variable “child care by relatives” that takes on value one for all mothers with
children age three or younger if relatives regularly take care of this child. Another dummy
variable “child care nursery” takes on value one if the child of age three and younger is
attending nursery school.
10For 1991, we exclude individuals living in East Germany given that in this particular wave information
for most labor market variables (participation, wages) are missing for East Germans.
11According to data from the Statistische A¨mter des Bundes und der La¨nder [2011], in 2011 only around
15% of children age three and younger in care attended public or publicly subsidized nurseries, while 85%
attended some form of private day care, compared to less than 1% of children between three and six.
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Child care by relatives might not only influence mothers’ labor force participation decision,
but at the same time its use might be a function of mothers’ labor force participation.
Hence, estimates using our direct measure are potentially biased by this endogeneity.
The same holds true for child care in nursery. Using our indirect measure solves this
problem but poses a different one, given that residence choices might not be independent
of mothers’ labor force participation decisions. However, given our data set we do not
have a way of dealing with this second endogeneity problem. On the other hand, our
indirect measure has the advantage of reflecting more than just actually provided child
care by grandparents. If living close to parents or in-laws before having children affects
fertility decisions, this measure might also reflect “potentially” provided child care and
thus would prove particularly useful to test effects on fertility. On the other hand, if
individuals continue to live close to parents or in-laws after children have grown beyond
the child care age, the measure might reflect “child care provided in the past”, which
could be useful to test effects on current wages. From both of our samples we exclude
individuals with incomplete or inconsistent information.12 Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide
summary statistics for both samples, for both women and mothers.
Description of the sample Our first sample consists of 10,732 women and 8,129
mothers. In the second sample we have information for 27,810 women and 3,390 mothers
of children age three or younger. Both samples only include women between 25 and 50,
with an average age of 38 years. With an average age of around 33 years, mothers in our
second sample are slightly younger given that in this sample we only consider mothers of
children age three and younger. We construct five different age groups, each containing
about one fifth of women in both samples. Given average late birth, the first age group in
our first sample only contains about one tenth of all mothers, while in our second sample
that only considers mothers of children age three and younger less than 1% are older than
44. Around two thirds of women and 80% of mothers in both samples are married and
around 1-5% has a nationality different from the German one. Approximately 75% of
women between 25 and 50 in both samples have children and around 20% are mothers of
small children (age 0-3). Among both mothers and women, around 1% has only completed
primary education, 72% finished secondary education, and around 27% completed tertiary
education.
12Hence, from both of our samples we exclude those who report to have worked regular full-or part
time jobs but who also report to have worked fewer than twenty hours a month. From our first sample
we exclude individuals who report to work regular full-or part time jobs but do not report their wage
income or firm tenure or report zero or negative values for any of the two variables. From our second
sample this exclusion criteria concerns those who report to work regular full-or part time jobs and who
do not answer the question if they work and reside in the same town.
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Table 2.1: Means (Std.) - GSOEP pooled sample-
- 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006-
First Sample: Women 25-50 Mothers 25-50
Age 37.43 (7.09) 38.80 (6.58)
25-29 0.17 (0.38) 0.10 (0.30)
30-34 0.20 (0.40) 0.18 (0.39)
35-39 0.22 (0.41) 0.24 (0.43)
40-44 0.21 (0.41) 0.25 (0.42)
45-50 0.20 (0.40) 0.23 (0.42)
Married, living together 0.68 (0.46) 0.79 (0.40)
Other than German nationality 0.02 (0.13) 0.01 (0.12)
Children 0.76 (0.43) 1 (0)
Children 0-3 0.17 (0.37) 0.22 (0.42)
Primary education 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.09)
Secondary education 0.72 (0.45) 0.73 (0.44)
Tertiary education 0.27 (0.45) 0.26 (0.44)
Regular fulltime job 0.36 (0.48) 0.25 (0.43)
Regular part time job 0.24 (0.43) 0.29 (0.45)
Small community 0.45 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50)
Medium community 0.26 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44)
Large community 0.29 (0.46) 0.26 (0.44)
in West Germany 0.75 (0.43) 0.72 (0.45)
in East Germany 0.25 (0.43) 0.28 (0.45)
Parents or in-laws in same house 0.14 (0.34) 0.13 (0.34)
Parents or in-laws close 0.42 (0.49) 0.44 (0.50)
- Parents or in-laws in same neighborhood 0.19 (0.39) 0.21 (0.41)
- Parents or in-laws in same town 0.23 (0.42) 0.24 (0.42)
Parents or in-laws far away 0.44 (0.50) 0.43 (0.49)
- Parents or in-laws one hour away 0.29 (0.45) 0.29 (0.45)
- Parents or in-laws further away 0.15 (0.35) 0.13 (0.34)
Parents or in-laws in foreign country 0.005 (0.07) 0.005 (0.07)
Spouse’s income* 2844.46 (2361.99) 2865.04 (2159.02)
Hourly wage** 12.36 (6.22) 12.05 (6.21)
Tenure in firm** 8.40 (7.33) 8.89 (7.56)
N 10,732 8,129
*Only taking into account strictly positive income (N = 7, 323, N = 6, 083 for mothers) **Among those working regular part-or fulltime jobs
(N = 6, 471 ,N = 4, 348 for mothers)
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Table 2.2: Means (Std.) - GSOEP pooled sample -
-1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006-
Second Sample: Women 25-50 Mothers 25-50
of children age ≤ 3
Age 38.09 (7.14) 33.06 (4.40)
25-29 0.15 (0.36) 0.23 (0.43)
30-34 0.18 (0.39) 0.40 (0.49)
35-39 0.21 (0.41) 0.28 (0.45)
40-44 0.22 (0.41) 0.08 (0.27)
45-50 0.23 (0.42) 0.005 (0.07)
Married, living together 0.66 (0.47) 0.80 (0.40)
Other than German nationality 0.02 (0.15) 0.05 (0.20)
Children 0.75 (0.43) 1 (0)
Children 0-3 0.16 (0.37) 1 (0)
Primary education 0.01 (0.10) 0.008 (0.09)
Secondary education 0.71 (0.45) 0.72 (0.45)
Tertiary education 0.28 (0.45) 0.27 (0.45)
Regular fulltime job 0.35 (0.48) 0.07 (0.25)
Regular part time job 0.24 (0.43) 0.14 (0.34)
Small community 0.48 (0.50) 0.47 (0.50)
Medium community 0.25 (0.43) 0.27 (0.44)
Large community 0.27 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44)
in West Germany 0.74 (0.44) 0.77 (0.42)
in East Germany 0.26 (0.44) 0.23 (0.42)
Children in Nursery - 0.46 (0.50)
Children cared for by relatives - 0.34 (0.47)
Spouse’s income* 3122.98 (2259.43) 3126.92 (1853.81)
Tenure in firm** 8.68 (7.61) 7.11 (5.41)
Job in town** 0.39 (0.49) 0.39 (0.49)
N 27,810 3,390
*Only taking into account strictly positive income (N = 17, 544, N = 2, 581 for mothers)**Among those working regular part-or fulltime jobs
(N = 16, 343 N = 690, for mothers)
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For mothers this last percentage is slightly lower, while a larger fraction of mothers has
completed secondary education.13 Around 35% of women have a regular fulltime job and
25% hold a regular part time job. For mothers in our first sample both percentages are
similar of around 25% and 29% respectively. In our second sample that only considers
mothers of children age three and younger 7% work regular fulltime jobs while 14% hold
a regular part time job. More women live in small communities than in medium sized or
large communities. The large majority (72-77%) of women and mothers in both samples
lives in West Germany. Around 43% of women and mothers in the sample live in the
same neighborhood or town as their parents or in-laws, while 13% live in the same house
or household and around 44% live at least one hour away from their parents or in-laws.
Almost half of all mothers in our second sample use nursery care for their children age
three and younger, while a little over one third has their children cared for by relatives
on a regular basis. Considering only those women or mothers whose spouse has a strictly
positive income, the average monthly spouse’s income is around 3000AC.14 Hourly wages
of women and mothers are around 12AC. On average, these individuals have been with
their current employer for the last 7 to 9 years. Around 40% of women and mothers work
and reside in the same town.
Proximity to Parents and Fertility For women living in the same neighborhood or
town as their parents or in-laws the probability to have children is around 4 percentage
points higher compared to women living further away. Table 2.3 displays marginal effects
from the probit estimation for the probability of having children. Controlling for marital
status, spouse’s income, region of residence, the size of the community, age, year effects,
and education, geographical proximity to potential grandparents has a significantly pos-
itive effect on fertility. Concerning the other variables of the regression, the likelihood
of being a mother for women in Germany between 25 and 50 is clearly positively influ-
enced by their marital status. Being married raises the probability of having children by
almost 30 percentage points. Furthermore, higher spouse’s income and living in East Ger-
many and in a small community increases the probability while higher education reduces
the probability as does living in a large community, relative to living in a medium-sized
community. Including an interaction term between living close to parents or in-laws and
educational attainment into the regression, we find that the positive effect of living close
13Given few women and mothers who only completed primary education, for our estimations we group
those having completed primary and secondary education and only differentiate between women with
and without tertiary education.
14Note that when pooling the sample we only adjust wages for the change from Deutschmark to Euro.
We do not adjust for wage growth, given stagnant real hourly net wages in Germany between 1991 and
2006 (see Figure 1 in DIW [2009]).
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to parents or in-laws on women’s fertility is particularly strong for women with university
education.15
Table 2.3: Effect of close Presence of Grandparents on Fertility
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation for Having Children
Married, living together 0.287*** (0.012)
Other than German nationality 0.007 (0.027)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.004*** (0.001)
in East Germany 0.153*** (0.008)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) -0.089*** (0.010)
Parents or in-laws close 0.041*** (0.009)
Parents or in-laws in same house 0.002 (0.013)
Small community 0.029*** (0.010)
Large community -0.060*** (0.012)
Observations 10,732
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel 91,96,01,06; Women 25-50. All
regressions include year dummies and age group dummies. Reference group: unmarried
women age 25-29 living in West Germany with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4) in
1991, in a medium-sized town, far from parents or in-laws.
Proximity to Parents, Child Care by Relatives and Participation of Mothers
For our estimations regarding labor force participation we only consider a woman in the
labor force if she works a regular part-or fulltime job. The probability to hold a regular
part-or fulltime job for mothers residing close to their parents or in-laws is 3 percentage
points higher compared to mothers residing further away.16 The first column of Table 2.4
15See Table A.1 of the Appendix. Estimation results are consistent to the inclusion of a polynomial
for age instead of age group dummies as well as to including years of education instead of educational
categories. Given that marital status and spouse’s income might be correlated with living close to parents
or in-laws we also check consistency of results, excluding both variables (see Table A.2 of the Appendix).
16This is slightly lower than the range of 4 to 10 percentage points estimated by Compton and Pol-
lak [2011] for the US. Note that the positive relation between proximity and labor force participation
only holds for mothers. Running the same probit estimation for men and single childless women shows
non-significant coefficients for proximity. In addition, for single childless women the coefficient for living
in the same house is negative and significant, see Table A.3 of the Appendix.
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displays the marginal effects from a probit regression for the probability of having a regular
part-or fulltime job in Germany for mothers age 25 to 50.
Table 2.4: Effect of Grandparent-Provided Child Care on Mothers’ Participation
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation for Mothers’ Labor Force Participation
Regular Part or Regular Part or
Fulltime Job Fulltime Job
(1) (2)
Children 0-3 -0.373*** (0.015)
Married, living together -0.137*** (0.017) -0.062*** (0.021)
Other than German nationality -0.127** (0.053) -0.070** (0.031)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.007*** (0.002) 0.003 (0.002)
in East Germany 0.126*** (0.014) 0.106*** (0.020)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.173*** (0.013) 0.075*** (0.017)
Parents or in-laws close 0.029** (0.013)
Parents or in-laws in same house 0.034* (0.018)
Children cared for
by relatives 0.155*** (0.016)
Children in nursery 0.090*** (0.014)
Small community -0.005 (0.014) -0.014 (0.017)
Large community 0.017 (0.016) 0.029 (0.019)
Observations 8,129 3,390
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Data: GSOEP
unbalanced panel 1) 91,96,01,06; Mothers 25-50. Reference group: unmarried mothers age 25-29 with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED:0-4)
in 1991, in a medium-sized town in West Germany, far from parents or in-laws, with children older than 3. 2) 97,99,00,01,02,03,05,06;
Mothers (25-50) of children <= 3 years. Reference group: unmarried mothers age 25-29 in 1997, with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4),
in a medium-sized town in West Germany, with children age 0-3 who are not in nursery nor cared for by relatives. All regressions
include, year dummies and age group dummies.
In addition to the control variables of the first regression, we also include a dummy vari-
able that indicates if the mother has a small child (age 0 to 3). The probability of holding
a regular part-or fulltime job decreases strongly in the presence of a small child, decreases
with marriage, and increases with tertiary education compared to primary or secondary
education. The probability that a mother is working is lower for those of a foreign na-
tionality, it is higher if she is residing in East Germany and it also increases with her age,
because mothers age jointly with their children and older children facilitate mothers’ labor
force participation. Higher spouse’s income is associated positively to mothers’ labor force
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participation. While higher spouse’s income relaxes the household’s budget constraint and
thus allows a mother to stay home, many of those married to men of higher income are
high-skilled women (assortative matching) for whom staying home implies higher forgone
wages. Here the latter effect seems to dominate the former. Living in the same house
with parents or in-laws has a stronger effect on mother’s labor force participation than
simply living close by. This result might be due to the fact that if living in the same
house as parents or in-laws is due to the need for intensive care for parents or represents a
temporary living arrangement this might detain women from having children. However,
for women who have decided to become mothers, living in the same house as parents or
in-laws is probably not related to this type of situation. On the contrary, for mothers hav-
ing parents or in-laws as close as possible facilitates their participation in the labor market.
We obtain stronger results for our alternative analysis that uses the more direct measure
’child care by relatives’ (see column two of Table 2.4). For mothers of children age three
and younger, having relatives taking care of their child increases chances of holding a
regular full-or part time job by around 15 percentage points, an effect much stronger than
that caused by having the child attending a nursery school, associated to an increase of 9
percentage points. Hence, the net effect of relative-provided child care on the probability
of holding a regular part-or fulltime job is given by the difference of 6 percentage points.
For this alternative estimation, marginal effects of all other variables on the probability
of holding a regular part-or fulltime job are similar, with the exception of the coefficient
for spouse’s income not being significant.17
Proximity to Parents and Wages While grandparent-provided child care seems to be
a way to promote fertility and mothers’ labor force participation, the required proximity
to one’s parents or in-laws may imply a cost given the spatial restrictions it imposes on
one’s potential labor market. In order to study the possible negative effect of living close
to parents or in-laws on wage incomes of mothers we consider wage incomes of dependent
workers of regular full-or part time jobs. Controlling for selection effects, we find that
mothers living close to their parents or in-laws earn significantly lower hourly wages. The
first column of Table 2.3 displays the coefficients for the Heckman selection model for log
hourly wages for mothers in Germany age 25 to 50.
17All estimation results are consistent to the inclusion of a polynomial for age instead of age group
dummies as well as to including years of education instead of educational categories. Marital status and
spouse’s income might be correlated with living close to parents or in-laws, and having a child in a nursery
may be correlated with child care by relatives. Hence, we also check the robustness of our results to the
exclusion of these variables (see Table A.4 of the Appendix). Including interaction terms for living close
to parents and education, or child care by relatives and education does not change results and coefficients
of these terms turn out to not be statistically significant.
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Table 2.5: Effect of Close Presence of Grandparents on Hourly Wages
Coefficients of Heckman Selection Model for Mothers’ Log Hourly Wages
Log hourly Selection
wage Equation
(1) (2)
Married, living together -0.020 (0.016) -0.348*** (0.044)
Other than German nationality -0.130* (0.078) -0.320** (0.138)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.296*** (0.015) 0.446*** (0.036)
Parents or in-laws close -0.051*** (0.014) 0.071** (0.032)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.051** (0.021) 0.083* (0.047)
Small community -0.032** (0.016) -0.012 (0.036)
Large community 0.057*** (0.018) 0.044 (0.041)
in East Germany -0.206*** (0.015) 0.319*** (0.035)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.016*** (0.005)
Children 0-3 -0.999*** (0.044)
Tenure in firm 0.016*** (0.001)
Constant 1.833*** (0.046) 0.060 (0.080)
Observations 8,129 8,129
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data: GSOEP
unbalanced panel 91,96, 01,06; Mothers 25-50. Reference group: unmarried mothers of age 25-29 of children older than 3
living in West Germany, with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED:0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized West German town, far from
parents or in-laws. All regressions include year dummies and age group dummies.
While living close to parents or in-laws or in the same house with them increases the
probability of holding a regular part-or fulltime job, it reduces hourly wages by 5%.18
Concerning the other variables and controlling for selection effects hourly wages in Ger-
many of mothers between 25 and 50 are higher for those living in large communities and
they increase with firm tenure, each additional year increases hourly wages by 1.6%. In
addition, having tertiary education rather than primary or secondary education increases
hourly wages by around 30%. On the other hand, living in small communities, not be-
ing German, and living in East Germany are all aspects that negatively influence hourly
wages.19
18Log monthly wages, controlled for by hours worked, show a slightly higher discount for living close
(see Table A.5 of the Appendix) as does not controlling for selection (see Table A.6 of the Appendix for
an OLS regression of log hourly wages).
19 Estimation results are consistent to the inclusion of a polynomial for age instead of age group dum-
mies as well as to including years of education instead of educational categories. Marital status and
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Proximity to Parents and Commutes Lower wages are just one way in which costs of
spatial restrictions may become apparent. Other costs may arise from longer commutes,
as suggested by Rupert et al [2009] who looking at French data find that mothers in
particular with small children who have low bargaining power as workers incur in longer
commuting times. We find that for working mothers of children age three and younger
the probability of residing and working in the same town is around 12 percentage points
lower, and hence they are more likely to have to incur in costly commuting if their children
are regularly cared for by relatives. Table 2.6 displays marginal effects from the probit
estimation for the probability of working and residing in the same town, i.e. not having
to commute, for mothers in Germany age 25 to 50 with children of age three and younger.
Table 2.6: Effect of Grandparent-Provided Child Care on Commutes
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation of Working and Residing in Same Town
Married, living together -0.113** (0.048)
Other than German nationality 0.517*** (0.098)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.012 (0.008)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) -0.013 (0.044)
Tenure in firm 0.004 (0.004)
Children cared for by relatives -0.119*** (0.040)
Children in nursery -0.062 (0.045)
Small community -0.271*** (0.045)
Large community 0.260*** (0.053)
in East Germany 0.113** (0.051)
Observations 690
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel, 97,99,00,01,02,03,05,06; mothers 25-50 of children <= 3 years. Reference
Group: unmarried mothers of age 25-29 in 1997 with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4) in a medium-sized
West German town, with children age 0-3 who are not in nursery, nor cared for by relatives. All regressions
include age group dummies and year dummies.
While having relatives caring for children on a regular basis increases chances of having
spouse’s income might be correlated with living close to parents or in-laws. Hence, we also check the
robustness of our results to the exclusion of these variables (see Table A.7 of the Appendix). Includ-
ing interaction terms for living close to parents or in-laws and education does not change results and
coefficients of these terms turn out to not be statistically significant.
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to commute, having children in a nursery on the other hand, does not significantly affect
the probability of being able to work and reside in the same town. On the other hand, the
probability to be able to work and reside in the same town is higher for foreign mothers,
those living in large communities, and those residing in East Germany, while it decreases
with marriage, and is lower for mothers living in small communities.20
Individual Fixed Effects We also try to exploit the panel nature of this data set and
run individual fixed effect regressions. This allows us to control for unobservable individ-
ual heterogeneity (for instance in preferences for living close to one’s parents or in-laws)
which might be correlated with the outcome variables: having children or participating in
the labor market. To this end, we consider women in Germany aged 25 to 50 who stayed
in the sample from 1991 to 1996. Given the reduced size of the balanced sample we join
the variables “parents or in-laws in same house” and “parents or in-laws close” into one
variable. As very few women become first-time mothers during the course of staying in
the sample, none of the coefficients in individual fixed effect regressions for fertility turn
out to be significant. Similarly, in individual fixed wage regressions the coefficient for the
variable “parents or in-laws close” is not significant. However, we can report significant
estimates for the probability of holding a regular part-or fulltime job (see Table 2.5).
Controlling for individual fixed effects, mothers living close to their parents or in-laws are
more likely to hold a regular part-or fulltime job. Coefficients of other control variables of
the individual fixed effect estimation are comparable to the marginal effects found for the
pooled sample (see Table 2.2).21 Marriage and the presence of small children negatively
affect mothers’ labor force participation.
While we find a positive relationship between grandparent-provided child care and fertil-
ity, and grandparent-provided child care and regular labor force participation by mothers,
on the other hand, we observe that for mothers, grandparent-provided child care is re-
lated to lower wages and more commutes. From these opposing relationships a set of
interesting questions arise: What are the net effects of grandparent-provided child care
on aggregate employment and fertility? How valuable is grandparent-provided child care
in terms of fertility and employment? However, given strong interdependencies among
women’s decisions regarding residence, fertility, and labor force participation and despite
some adjustments (using proximity as an indirect measure for child care and running indi-
20Again results are consistent to the way age and education are included. Having a child in a nursery
may be correlated with child care by relatives. Hence, we also check the robustness of our results to
the exclusion of this variable ( see Table A.8 of the Appendix). Including interaction terms for having
relatives taking care of one’s children and education does not change results and coefficients of these
terms turn out to not be statistically significant.
21The estimated coefficient for “parents or in-laws close” is equal to a marginal effect of 0.28.
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Table 2.7: Grandparent-provided Child Care and Participation
Coefficients of Individual Fixed Effects Estimation
Regular Part or
Fulltime Job
Children 0-3 -2.009*** (0.435)
Married, living together -2.100** (0.862)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.025 (0.080)
Parents or in-laws close ‡ 1.277** (0.564)
Small community 0.129 (0.954)
Large community 0.152 (1.000)
in East Germany -14.422 (1,099.009)
Observations 328
Number of person. 164
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. ‡includes in same house.
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;
Fixed Effect Estimation Data: (other nationality and educational category
omitted because of no within-group variance) GSOEP balanced panel 91-96
mothers 25-50 Reference group: unmarried mothers age 25-29 with education
level 1 or 2 (ISCED:0-4) in West Germany in a medium-sized town, living far
from their parents or in-laws, with children older than 3. All regressions
include age group dummies and year dummies.
vidual fixed effect regressions) our empirical analysis still faces endogeneity problems and
we do not claim to have established any causal relationships. Hence, in order to better
disentangle women’s decision as well as to answer the proposed questions, in the next
section we present our model economy that explicitly takes into account the spatial re-
strictions of grandparent-provided child care. Our goal is to account for the relationships
between grandparent-provided child care, fertility and labor market outcomes observed in
the data. Hence, we then calibrate our model to the German economy along several key
dimensions and highlight the model’s mechanism behind women’s decisions that can po-
tentially generate the observed relationships. Finally, we perform several counterfactual
experiments to analyze how women’s decisions change under distinct scenarios regarding
availability of grandparent-provided child care and different family policies.
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3 The Model
We have a model of fertility and employment choice in which individuals also decide where
to live. There are two regions in the economy, ’Home’, H and ’Far’, F . Grandparent-
provided child care free of charge is only available in ’Home’. The model economy is
inhabited by a continuum of overlapping generations of married women of mass one.22
Women live for five periods, two as children (0-9 years and 10-19 years), one as young
fertile adults (20-29 years), one as fertile middle-aged adults (30-39 years) and one as
old adults (40-49 years).23 Decisions regarding residence are only made when women are
fertile young adults. During the two fertile stages of adulthood, young and middle-aged,
women can decide how many children to have. In each of the three periods of adult life,
women have to decide how much to work, and if they have children, how many resources
in term of time and money to spend on educating their children. There is also a govern-
ment in this economy that taxes labor income at rate τ , and may provide family benefits
T conditional on having children and/or conditional on family income being below a cer-
tain threshold (T¯ ). The government may also subsidize child care at rate ω. Women are
born close to their parents so initially they reside in ’Home’, H. Each women’s region of
residence is denoted by j, where j = H,F .
Life-Course Offers At the beginning of their life as young fertile adults, women re-
ceive two ’life-course offers’, one associated to living in ’Home’ and another ’life-course’
associated to living in ’Far’. A ’life-course offer’ is i) a realization of labor productivity xj
and ii) an exogenous source of income, zj representing a spouse’s income, where j = H,F .
There are N possible labor productivities and N possible exogenous incomes. Therefore,
there are NxN possible offers for staying ’Home’ and NxN possible offers for moving ’Far’.
The probability that a married woman receives an offer (xH , zH) in ’Home’ and an offer
(xF , zF ) if she moves to ’Far’ is given by the matching matrix Π(xH , zH , xF , zF ). Produc-
tivity offers do not need to be the same, they can be higher in ’Far’ xF > xH , equal in
both regions xF = xH , or higher in ’Home’ xF < xH . A woman who receives an offer in
’Home’ where the labor productivity is equal to xH will receive an offer in ’Far’ where the
22Given that only 7% of single women are mothers, while 76% of married women are mothers we only
model married women’s decisions. And in order to keep the analysis tractable we abstain from modeling
a marriage market even though marriage and residence decisions might be related and we simply assign
an exogenous income to each woman to represent her husband’s income.
23Availability of free child care obviously depends on grandparents being able and willing to take care
of grandchildren. Even though individuals might still be working as old adults, we assume that close to
parents or in-laws there is some type of family network that takes care of children free of charge. We
also assume that there are no costs associated with taking care of grandchildren as, for now, we are only
concerned about the effects of spatially restricted free child care on mothers’ labor market outcomes
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labor productivity is equal to (1 + κxF ). This implies that in case she receives the same
productivity offer in both regions, she will earn a wage premium in ’Far’, representing
a larger labor market, where her exact same skills can be matched better. Women are
endowed with one unit of productive time.
Residence Choice Women’s residence choice, D is a binary variable that takes on
value 0 if women reside at ’Home’, close to their parents and 1 if their chosen residence
is ’Far’.
D =
{
1 if j = F
0 if j = H.
Working Choice Women can decide on the extensive and intensive margin of their
labor force participation where l is the fraction of time they allocate to work. Women
thus have the following after-tax wage income, W
W = (1− τ)xj(1 +Dκ)l,
where j = H,F , and κ > 0.
Children Women can have children when they are fertile. Children live in the household
for two periods. Children receive education each period depending on the resources that
the mother decides to spend on the child. We denote by b the amount of money that a
woman decides to spend on her children, and t is the amount of time that she dedicates
to take care of them. The time a child spends in child care (tc) can enhance the child’s
education. The child’s education function is denoted by
e = E(k, t, tc, b).
Child care Women with young children (0-9 years) who work require child care, hence
time spent in child care is equal to the time a mother is at work (tc = l). The price of
child care, p(D) depends on the woman’s residence choice in the following way: p(0) = 0
and p(1) > 0. If a woman lives close to her parents she obtains free child care, else she has
to purchase child care at price p(1). She might receive a subsidy ω from the government,
thus actually paying (1 − ω)p(1) for each unit of time her child spends in child care.24
24We assume that this subsidy is only paid to those women who purchase child care at price p(1), i.e.
to those living in ’Far’.
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Mothers with children older than 9 do not pay for child care, independently of where they
reside.25
Utility Adult women derive utility from consumption, children, and leisure. Let k be
the number of children a woman decides to have. The utility that women enjoy each
period is given by
U(c, 1− l, k, e) = u(c) + ul(1− l) + ue(k, e).
Children do not take any decisions but simply receive education.
Timing of Decisions When women become young fertile adults, they receive ’life-
course offers’ and they decide which one to realize, i.e. whether to reside close to their
parents or not. After residence decisions have been made, women have to decide how many
children to have, and how to split their time between working, taking care of children,
and leisure. Women move or not, they work the respective share of time, and if they have
children, they have to purchase child care if they work and live far away from their parents.
Women decide how many resources to devote to their children, and they consume. From
then on, they remain in the chosen region of residence.
Government The government in this economy collects labor income taxes τ , pays lump-
sum transfers T conditional on having children and having an income below a certain
threshold, T¯ , provides a child care subsidy, ω and consumes G. The budget constraint of
the government has to be balanced each period
(τ)Y = G+ P,
where Y is the total income of the economy and P is the amount of subsidies and transfers
that the government pays to women.
3.1 Value functions
We start by defining the value functions for old adults. Old adults cannot have small
children but they might have older children born the previous period.
25Children older than 9, attend free public school during the time their mother works.
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Old adult In the last period of women’s adults lives, residence decisions do not change,
but older children (10-19 years) born in the previous period, might still be present in
the household. Let km denote these children. Old adults thus have to decide how many
resources to spend on their children and how much to work. Old adults derive utility
from children, consumption, and leisure. The value of being an old individual living close
is given by
Ho(xH , zH , km) = max
l,t,b
U(c, 1− l, km, e)
subject to the following budget constraint
(1− τ)(xH l + zH) + TIT¯ Ik = Ψ(a, km)c+ b
and the education production function
e = E(km, t, tc, b).
If a woman has children and her family income is below the threshold T¯ she might receive
some family benefits from the government, T . We denote by IT¯ the indicator function that
takes on value one if the family income is below the threshold, T¯ . The indicator function
Ik equals one if a woman has children. There are economies of scale in consumption,
Ψ(a, km), where a indicates the number of adults in the household and thus is equal to
two for a married couple. The optimal labor decision of an old woman living close is
denoted by LHo (x
H , zH , km). Optimal decisions in terms of money and time devoted to
children are denoted by BHo (x
H , zH , km) and T
H
o (x
H , zH , km) respectively. Given that only
older children might be present in the household, old women living far away do not have
to purchase child care. The value of being an old woman living far is given by
F o(xF , zF , km) = max
l,t,b
U(c, 1− l, km, e)
subject to the following budget constraint
(1− τ)(xF (1 + κ)l + zF ) + TIT¯ Ik = Ψ(a, km)c+ b
and the education production function
e = E(km, t, tc, b).
The optimal labor decision of an old woman living further away is denoted by LFo (x
F , zF , km).
Optimal decisions in terms of money and time devoted to children are denoted byBFo (x
F , zF , km)
and T Fo (x
F , zF , km) respectively.
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Middle-aged adult Middle-aged adults have to decide how many children to have,
how much to work, and if they have children they have to decide how many resources in
terms of time and money to spend on the education of their children. Middle-aged adults
can have both small (km) and older (ky) children who were born the previous period. Let
k denote the number of children present in the household, k = km + ky. The value of
being a middle-aged woman living close is given by
Hm(xH , zH , ky) = max
l,t,b,km
U(c, 1− l, k, e) + βHo(xH , zH , km)
subject to the following budget constraint
(1− τ)(xH l + zH) + TIT¯ Ik = Ψ(a, k)c+ b
and the education production function
e = E(k, t, tc, b).
Note that middle-aged fertile adults living at home have access to free child care as they
remain close to their parents. Thus, they spend an amount b of resources on their children
and during a fraction t of their available time they take care of their children. If they work
they leave their small children with their grandparents. The optimal labor decision of a
middle-aged woman living close is denoted by Lcm(x
H , zH , ky). The optimal number of
small children is given by KHm (x
H , zH , ky), optimal decisions in terms of money and time
devoted to all children are denoted by BHm(x
H , zH , ky) and T
H
m (x
H , zH , ky) respectively.
Given that small children require child care while the mother works, women living far
might have to pay child care for their small children. The value of being a middle-aged
woman living far is given by
Fm(xF , zF , ky) = max
l,t,b,km
U(c, 1− l, k, e) + βF o(xF , zF , km)
subject to the following budget constraint
(1− τ)(xF (1 + κ)l + zF ) + TIT¯ Ik = Ψ(a, k)c+ b+ (1− ω)p(1)lIkm
and the education production function
e = E(k, t, tc, b),
where Ikm is an indicator function that takes on value one if there are small children
in the household. A middle-aged fertile adult with small children living further away
has to purchase child care at price p(1) for each unit of time she decides to work. She
23
has to decide how to divide her time between work, l, taking care of her children, t,
and leisure. She also decides on how much to spend on the education of her children,
b. Moreover, if she works, she might receive child care subsidies, ω per unit of time her
children spend in child care. The optimal labor decision of a middle-aged woman living
further away is denoted by LFm(x
F , zF , ky). The optimal number of small children is given
by KFm(x
F , zF , ky), optimal decisions in terms of money and time devoted to all children
are denoted by BFm(x
F , zF , ky) and T
F
m(x
F , zF , ky) respectively.
Young fertile adult Young fertile adults have to decide which ’life-course offer’ to
accept, i.e. whether to stay close to their parents or not. If they stay they obtain free
child care. If they move they might be able to enjoy higher labor productivity and a higher
spouse’s income. However, if women have children they have to pay child care costs per
unit of time worked. Once they have decided where to live, they decide how much to
work and how many children to have and how many resources to spend on educating
their children. The value of being a young fertile woman remaining close to her parents
(D = 0) is given by
Hy(xH , zH) = max
l,t,b,ky
U(c, 1− l, ky, e) + βHm(xH , zH , ky),
subject to the following budget constraint
(1− τ)(xH l + zH) + TIT¯ Ik = Ψ(a, ky)c+ b
and the education production function
e = E(ky, t, tc, b).
The continuation value of living in region H is the value of being a middle-aged woman
living in region H, because residence decisions cannot be reconsidered. For a woman
living close to her parents the optimal decision regarding how much to work is denoted
by LHy (x
H , zH), the optimal number of children is given by KHy (x
H , zH). The optimal
amount of time spent taking care of her children is THy (x
H , zH) and the optimal amount
of money spent on her children is given by BHy (x
H , zH).
If the woman decides to move (D = 1), then the value of living further away is denoted
by
F y(xF , zF ) = max
l,t,b,ky
U(c, 1− l, ky, e) + βFm(xF , zF , ky),
subject to the following budget constraint
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(1− τ)(xF (1 + κ)l + zF ) + TIT¯ Ik = Ψ(a, ky)c+ (1− ω)p(1)lIky + b
and the education production function
e = E(ky, t, tc, b).
Optimal decisions for a young fertile woman living further away are denoted by LFy (x
F , zF ),
KFy (x
F , zF ), T Fy (x
F , zF ) and, BFy (x
F , zF ).
Residence Decision Women have to decide whether to stay home or to move away.
They decide to move if the utility of living further away exceeds the utility of staying
close by, i.e.
D(xj, zj) =
{
1 if F y > Hy
0 otherwise.
where j = H,F .
Equilibrium The optimal decision rules for fertile young adults are as follows: Ljy(x
j, zj)
is the labor force participation decision, Kjy(x
j, zj) denotes the optimal number of chil-
dren, T jy (x
j, zj) denotes time spent with children, Bjy(x
j, zj) is the amount of money spent
on children, and Cjy(x
j, zj) is the level of consumption, where j = H,F denotes the region
where the woman resides. Optimal decisions for fertile middle-aged adults are as follows:
Ljm(x
j, zj, ky) is the labor force participation decision, K
j
m(x
j, zj, ky) denotes the optimal
number of small children, T jm(x
j, zj, ky) denotes time spent with children, B
j
m(x
j, zj, ky)
is the amount of money spent on children, and Cjm(x
j, zj, ky) is the level of consumption,
for j = H,F . The optimal decision rules for old women are as follows: Ljo(x
j, zj, km)
is the labor force participation decision and Cjo(x
j, zj, km) is the level of consumption,
T jo (x
j, zj, km) denotes time spent with children, B
j
o(x
j, zj, km) is the amount of money
spent on children, where j = H,F . Given a government policy (τ, T, T¯, ω,G), an initial
matrix of ’life-course offers’ Π(xH , zH , xF , zF ), a stationary equilibrium is a set of decision
rules, a distribution of residential choices, and the number of children born, K = Km+Ky
such that
1. The decision rules are the solutions to the value functions.
2. The distribution of residential choices is consistent with the decisions.
3. The government budget is balanced.
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4 Calibration Strategy
In this part of the paper we present the explicit functional forms for the utility function
and the education production function, and we fix some parameters of the model based
on available evidence. We calibrate the model’s remaining parameters to match several
labor market statistics of the German economy as well as German data on fertility.
4.1 Functional Forms
We specify women’s utility to be separable in consumption, children, and leisure. We
assume log utility in consumption and in leisure, while the utility in children’s quality
is linear. There are two weighting parameters. The weighting parameter for children
is denoted by φe and the weighting parameter for leisure in the utility function is φl.
The weighting parameter for consumption is normalized to 1. We thus specify the utility
function of a woman as
U(c, e, k, l) = log(c) + φeQ(e, k) + φllog(1− l − t).
Women receive utility from the number of children in the household and from the level
of education that their children have received. Following Becker and Tomes [1976], we
assume that there is a trade-off between the number of children in the household and the
education that households can provide for their children. To obtain this quantity-quality
trade-off regarding children in the utility function, we choose the following Cobb Douglas
specification for children’s quality
Q(e, k) = eλk1−λ,
where λ denotes the share of education for the production of a child’s quality.26
Education (e) in turn depends on a woman’s time spent taking care of her children, t,
the amount of money spent on the education of children, b and the form of child care.
Money and time are assumed to have a unit elasticity of substitution. The share of time
spent taking care of children in the education production function is equal to θ. There
are two types of child care: grandparent-provided child care and privately or publicly
provided child care. Grandparent-provided child care is only available to those living
close to their parents. We assume that both types of child care are equally productive
in terms of education. If women live far away from their parents, money can be spent
on children in two different ways. If the mother works an amount of time, l her children
26This specification has been used by others in the literature, see for instance Greenwood et al [2000].
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have to spend that same amount of time in private or public child care and she has to
pay an hourly cost of p(1). Private child care enhances children’s education. The other
possible expenditure on children is b, which represents any other type of expenditure re-
lated to children’s education. A woman living close to her parents does not have to spend
money on child care. To her the price for child care is 0. Given that time spent with
grandparents is assumed to be as productive as time spent in private or public child care,
leaving her children with her parents while working is equivalent to investing in child care.
The chosen functional form to represent the relationship between expenditure in private
child care and other education related expenditure is of the CES type. The elasticity of
substitution between these two types of expenditures is equal to 1
(1−ρ) and the weight of
expenditures b is represented by α. This functional form is flexible enough to capture
the degree of substitutability between these two different types of expenditure. We thus
specify the functional form of the education production function as
e = ((α(b)ρ + (1− α)lρ) 1ρ )θt1−θ.
4.2 Parameters
Some parameters of the model are fixed based on available evidence. We calibrate the
model’s remaining parameters to match several labor market statistics of the German
economy as well as German data on fertility. Most statistics used for calibrating the
remaining parameters come from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). For our
statistics we use pooled data from waves 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006. We consider weighted
statistics for married women age 20 to 50 born in Germany for whom information on par-
ents’ residence is available.27 Finally, we have a set of policy parameters which we will
set such as to represent German family policies.
In the model economy, there is an initial distribution of ’life-course offers’, Π(xH , zH , xF , zF ).
This matrix is chosen such that it is consistent with the existence of an initial distribu-
tion of young women’s labor productivities, Ω(x) and an initial distribution of men’s
labor productivities Θ(z). We assume a log normal distribution over productivity types
and we discretize the distribution to obtain different productivity levels, where the mean
and standard deviation are denoted by µx and σx respectively for women and µz and σz
for men. We specify ten different productivity types for women and we also have ten
different types of exogenous incomes. Men and women match according to a matching
27Note that we will join the variables “parents or in-laws in same house” and “parents or in-laws close”
(see Section 2 for more details on this data)
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function, Φ(x, z), where the probability that a woman of productivity type x1 (being the
lowest type) meets with a man of the same productivity type, z1 is equal to ψ. A frac-
tion, Π(xHi , z
H
j , x
F
i , z
F
j ) of married women receive life-course offers (x
H
i , z
H
j ) for staying
’Home’and (xFi , z
F
j ) for moving to ’Far’, for i being any of the N possible labor productiv-
ities of women and j being any of the N possible exogenous income. There will thus be
a hundred different types of matches between a woman and an exogenous income (spouse).
Parameters related to the productivity distributions for men and women µx, µz, σx, σz,
and the assortative matching parameter, ψ are set a priori based on available evidence.
Estimates for mean and standard deviation of the productivity distribution for women
are taken from log-hourly wages in our first pooled sample, which gives us the following
parameter values, µx = 2.41 and σx = 0.47. Similarly for spouses we have µz = 2.66 and
σz = 0.45. In order to build the matching matrix that assigns an exogenous income to
each woman based on information on who marries whom in the German economy, we take
the degree of assortative matching, i.e. how likely it is to meet your own productivity
type, ψ in Germany from Ferna´ndez et al. [2005]. The authors calculate this value to be
0.7 in Germany, i.e. 70% of women match with men of the exact same type, while the
remaining 30% are equally likely to match with men of types different from their own.
Also set a priori is the discount factor β. Given that one model period is equivalent to 10
years, the discount factor, β is set to a value of 0.675 in order to match a yearly interest
rate of 4%. Table 4.8 displays all parameters set a priori.
Table 4.8: Parameters based on a priori information
Parameter Explanation Value
µx mean log productivity of women 2.41
σx standard deviation of women’s log productivity 0.47
µz mean log productivity of spouses 2.66
σz standard deviation of spouses’ log productivity 0.45
n average working time of men 0.4
ψ assortative matching parameter 0.7
β Discount Factor 0.675
Parameters to be calibrated are the parameters of the utility function, φe, φl and the pa-
rameters of the education production function for children, λ, ρ, α, θ as well as the wage
premium for working in ’Far’, κ. Even though in a general equilibrium model all param-
eters affect all targets, we discuss briefly the data moments that each parameter is most
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likely to determine. The weight of children’s quality in utility, φe is set to a value of 1.3,
such as to match the ratio of the fertility rate between women living close to their parents
or in-laws and those living far away, 1.02. The weight of leisure in the utility function, φl
is given a value of 1.15 in order to match a labor force participation rate of 56.82% for
married women in Germany. The share of the number of children in the quality-quantity
trade-off function, λ is set to 0.38 in order to match a fertility rate of married women in
Germany of 1.71.
Values for the three parameters of the education production function, ρ, α, θ are chosen
so as to match data on expenditure on children as percentage of average income, time
spent with children by parental working status, and mothers’ productivities. According
to the German Federal Office of Statistics, in 2003 families spent on average 500 euros
per month on each child. The average family income in Germany was 3,750 Euros per
month in 2003 (German FSO) and German households with children have on average
1.9 children. Therefore, the expenditure on children for an average household is close
to 25% of family income. The ratio of time that a non-working mother spends with her
children in comparison to a working mother is 1.32. We calculate this ratio using data
provided in Ichino and Sanz de Galdeano [2004]. We take from Sayer et al. [2004] the time
high educated mothers (corresponding to the four most productive women in our model
economy) spend with their children as a percentage of their disposable time (16 hours
per day), 11.25%.28 Hence parameters ρ, α, θ of the education production function are
assigned values 0.7, 0.6, and 0.35 respectively. We use the labor force participation rate
of married women who live close to their parents or in-laws, 54.54% to match the wage
premium κ, which takes on value 0.05. Note that the magnitude of this wage premium
is very much in line with our empirical findings (see Table 2.5). Table 4.9 displays the
calibrated parameters of the model.
Finally, the model’s policy parameters are the income tax rate, τ , and the family policy in
terms of child care subsidies and family benefits, i.e. ω, T , and the threshold for eligibility
of family benefits T¯ respectively. All working individuals pay a proportional tax, τ on
labor income. We set τ to be equal to 37% which is equivalent to the income tax revenue
collected by the German government as a fraction of GDP (OECD [2010]). According to
the OECD [2009], all German families receive some family benefits for each child up to
the age of eighteen (Kindergeld). In particular, they receive 184 Euros per month for the
28In the model economy productivity types refer to hourly wage rates. However, when comparing
productivity types in the model to data we use education types as proxies for productivity types, given
that we also want to consider women who decide not to work and for whom we do not observe wages.
The six lowest types represent 70% of the total population. This is equivalent to the share of individuals
who have less education than college or tertiary education in Germany
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Table 4.9: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Explanation Value
φe weight of children 1.3
φl weight of leisure 1.15
λ share of education in Q function 0.38
α weight of b 0.7
ρ elasticity parameter between b and child care 0.6
θ share of expenditures 0.35
κ wage premium in ’Far’ 0.05
first child, 190 for the second and 205 for the third, fourth, fifth child etc. We set the
amount of family benefits in our economy, T such as to match the amount of Kindergeld
as a percentage of average family income received by a family with the average number
of children in Germany (1.9). Hence, T is set equal to 0.522. As all families receive this
help, the threshold IT¯ is not binding and T¯ = ∞. According to the same source, child
care subsidies are negligible in Germany and therefore, we set child care subsidies (ω) to
be equal to zero. For the cost of child care p(1), the OECD [2008] estimates that child
care costs in Germany amount to 9.1% of average income. Thus we set the price of child
care per hour such that child care costs in our model economy matches the average cost in
Germany. Hence p(1), takes on value 1. All policy parameters are displayed in Table 4.10.
Table 4.10: Policy Parameters
Parameter Explanation Value
Calibrated
T Family Benefits 0.522
p(1) cost of child care 1
Set a priori
ω child care subsidy 0
T¯ eligibility threshold ∞
30
5 Results: Benchmark Economy
In Table 5.11 we present model moments of our benchmark economy together with the
corresponding data moments. We use data moments along several dimensions relevant to
the analysis of women’s fertility behavior, labor force participation, and time and money
invested in the education of children.
Table 5.11: Data and Model Moments
Data Model
Average fertility rate 1.71 1.24
Difference in fertility rates close vs far 1.02 1.06
LFP rate of married women 56.82 49.00
LFP rate of married women close 58.10 54.52
Time spent with child non-working vs working mother 1.32 1.66
% of time spent by high educated mother 11.25 18.38
Expenditure on children as % of income 25.00 14.77
Child care costs as % of average income 9.10 10.00
Family benefits as % of income 10.00 10.00
Our model is able to capture that women living close to parents or in-laws have on aver-
age more children. However, the ratio of average fertility rates of women living close and
women living far is 1.02 in the German economy, while in our model this ratio is equal
to 1.06. Average fertility rates estimated by our model are lower compared to the data.
While the average German fertility rate among women between 20 and 50 is equal to 1.71,
in our model economy it is only 1.24. Regarding labor force participation of women, our
model replicates well the fact that labor force participation of married women who live
close exceeds average labor force participation of married women. Access to free child
care provided by grandparents makes it possible for women who live close to participate
more. However, given that we underestimate average labor force participation of married
women, as well as labor force participation of women living close to parents or in-laws,
differences in participation rates in our model are more pronounced than those observed in
the data. In Germany, 56.82% of married women participate in the labor market compared
to 58.10% of those who live close to their parents or in-laws. In the model economy labor
force participation of married women is 49.00%, while 54.52% of those who live close work.
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Considering investment in children’s education in terms of time and money, our model
overestimates the time educated mothers spend with their children. German mothers with
tertiary education spend on average 108 minutes per day taking care of their children,
which represents 11.25% of their disposable time. In our model, this percentage is 18.38%.
Comparing time spent by non-working and working mothers, according to German data,
non-working mothers spend an additional one third of time with their children compared
to working mothers. Our model overestimates this difference to be equal to two thirds.
We underestimate the fraction of income spent in children. According to German data,
the average family spends 25.00% of their income on children while in our model this
number is slightly lower and equal to 14.77%. Finally, we also use family benefits as a
share of average family income available in Germany and the expenditure on child care
costs as a share of average income to match our model to German data. In Germany,
families with children receive benefits equivalent to 10.00% of their average income, while,
the cost of child care that they face is equal to 9.10% of their average income. The model
replicates perfectly the amount of family benefits available in Germany and it also does
a good job in replicating the cost of child care.
On the whole, the model does match the data fairly well, even though it performs better
along some dimensions than others. However, model moments in Table 5.11 were targeted
explicitly to calibrate certain parameters of the model. In order to assess the model’s va-
lidity for carrying out policy analysis, we need to consider the model’s performance in
matching moments that have not been used for calibration. To this end we consider the
following five statistics related to women’s labor force participation. The first one is the
share of women who live far away and who participate in the labor market. The other
four statistics refer to labor force participation of mothers of different age groups and
according to where they reside. Table 5.12 shows these additional statistics and the cor-
responding data moments.
In Germany, labor force participation of married women living further away is equal to
55.28%, while in our model this number is equal to 43.90%. Thus the model slightly
underestimates participation rates of married women living further away. However, it
replicates well the fact that participation of married women living further away is lower
compared to labor force participation of women living close. The model also generates
statistics on the participation rates of different groups of mothers. In particular, we
are interested in the participation rates of mothers with small children (in the model ,
small children refers to children younger than 10). We argue that the main barrier for
participating in the labor market that women face when they move away is the high cost
of child care. Child care costs are highest when children are young. Therefore we would
want our model to be consistent with the shares of working mothers with small children
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in Germany. In the data, the participation rate of young mothers (between 20 and 29)
with small children who live close is equal to 31.01%, while the participation rate of
young mothers who live further away is equal to 24.54%. The model overestimates both
statistics, but does generate the observation that young mothers with small children who
live far participate less in the labor market than those who live close. The observed labor
market participation rates in Germany of middle aged mothers (between 30 and 39) with
small children are higher than those of younger mothers, 46.08% for those who live close
and 39.50% for those who live further away. Even though the model overestimates labor
force participation rates of middle aged mothers, it generates the fact that middle aged
mothers work more than young mothers. The mechanism driving this result in the model
is that most middle aged mothers have had a child from the previous period, thus it is
more expensive to have more children which means that in order to pay for child expenses
they need to work more compared to when they were young and had fewer children.
To summarize, even though the model overestimates labor force participation rates of
almost all groups of mothers of small children it generates the observed differences in
participation rates by distance to parents and by age profile. In addition, our model also
replicates very well the share of women who move away from parents or in-laws. While
in the data, around 45% of women live far away from their parents, in our model, almost
47% of women live far away from parents or in-laws.
Table 5.12: Data and Model Moments: Not used for calibration
Data Model
LFP rate of women, away 55.28 43.90
LFP rate of married young mothers with small children, close 31.01 50.68
LFP rate of married young mothers with small children, far 24.54 31.71
LFP rate of married middle-aged mothers with small children, close 46.08 54.68
LFP rate of married middle-aged mothers with small children, far 39.50 43.90
share of female married population moving away 45.42 46.82
6 Mechanisms at work: Who moves
In our model, young fertile women receive two different ’life-course offers’, one for living
in ’Home’ and another one for living in ’Far’. These offers include realizations of labor
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productivities as well as an exogenous income, representing a spouse’s income. In ad-
dition, if women decide to have children they have access to free grandparent-provided
child care if they remain in ’Home’ while if they move away, they have to pay child care
costs for each hour that they work. Thus, when women decide whether to move or not
they face a trade-off between potentially better labor market opportunities and free child
care. If they receive a better labor productivity offer in ’Home,’ there is no doubt that
they will stay. In case the offer is higher in Far, women who decide to not have children
will move, while among those who plan to have children only those who can afford to
pay for child care move. For instance, women who receive the same labor productivity
offer in ’Home’ and ’Far’ and thus receive a wage premium κ in ’Far’ only move if the
premium allows them to pay for child care costs. However, this is not the whole story, a
married woman’s exogenous income (spouse’s productivity type) also plays an important
role in her residence decision. Thus if a woman receives a high exogenous income she
might decide to move as child care costs are no longer a barrier.
In order to analyze more thoroughly who moves and who does not move in our model
economy, we identify four subgroups of women: (i) low productivity type women married
to low productivity type men, (ii) low productivity type women married to high pro-
ductivity type men, (iii) high productivity type women married to low productivity type
men, and (iv) high productivity type women married to high productivity type men. In
Table 6.13 we display the share of women who move in the model and in the data by
these four sub-groups. In our model, low productivity individuals are identified as the six
lowest types in the productivity distribution while the high productivity individuals are
the four highest types.29 The model does quite a good job in matching how many women
remain close according to the subgroups mentioned above.30 We observe that 50% of
married women belonging to the high-low subgroup move, while in the data around 47%
of them move. These statistics are very similar for the low-high subgroup. The low-low
subgroup is the one that displays the lowest mobility. In the model, around 41% of women
belonging to the low-low group move while in the data this share is close to 43%. On the
contrary, the high-high subgroup display the highest mobility both in the data, 52.77%
and in the model, 52.34%.
We find that women work less if they live far away from their parents or in-laws, even
after controlling for education and wage of their spouses (see Table 2.2). Our model
replicates this fact as in both regions there are both high productivity women, equivalent
29The six lowest types represent 70% of the total population. This is equivalent to the share of
individuals without tertiary education in Germany.
30By ’Far’ we mean the same as in the empirical part of the paper. Those living an hour away or
further from their parents or in-laws are considered to live in ’Far’.
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Table 6.13: % of women living away by type and husband’s type
Low productivity men High productivity men
data model data model
Low productivity women 43.24% 41.17% 47.65% 49.23%
High productivity women 47.19% 50% 52.77% 52.34%
to high educated women, and low productivity women. And in both regions there are
women who are married to high productivity type men and others who are married to
low productivity type men. Those who belong to the low-low productivity group are less
mobile as child care costs constitute an important barrier for them. Meanwhile, those who
belong to the high-high productivity group are the most mobile individuals. Child care
costs are not binding for them. Thus, in the presence of child care costs, the existence of
free informal child care arrangements enables in particular mothers of low productivity
to work.31 In absence of grandparents, income of low productivity women would be too
low to pay for child care costs and therefore they would decide to not work or not to have
children. Meanwhile women who dispose of a relatively high exogenous income are able
to not work, stay home taking care of their children, and enjoy more leisure.
7 Counterfactual Experiments
In this section we consider two distinct scenarios regarding availability of grandparent-
provided child care and different family policies, and we simulate our model to analyze how
women’s decisions on residence, fertility, and labor force participation change. In our first
counterfactual experiment we analyze a situation where grandparents are not available to
take care of their grandchildren and everyone has to pay for child care, while our second
counterfactual experiment considers an increase in subsidies for paid child care. The pur-
pose of our first experiment is to quantify the importance of grandparent-provided child
care. There are several reasons why the provision of child care by grandparents might be
reduced in the future. Women’s age at first child birth has been increasing over the last
decades. In 2009, German mothers were on average 30 years old when giving birth to
their first child, while in 1970 average age at first child’s birth was 24 (OECD [2008]). As
31Similarly, Arpino et al [2010] find that grandparent-provided child care increases, in particular labor
force participation of low educated mothers of young children.
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successive generations of women delay birth, grandparents may be to be too old or too
sick to take of their grandchildren. On the other hand, women’s labor force participation
and individuals’ retirement age has been and is increasing in many countries and hence
situations where both generations of women, grandmothers and adult daughters, are of
working age when grandchildren come along are going to be even more likely to occur in
the future.32 Regarding our second experiment, we consider a subsidy for child care as a
policy instrument given the positive relationship found in the literature between availabil-
ity of child care and female labor force participation.33 We set the subsidy to 50 per cent
of child care costs as this is the amount of subsidy needed to reduce the cost of child care
in our Benchmark model such as to be equal to the cost that families in Sweden face. In
Sweden, child care costs are among the lowest in the OECD countries and they amount
to 4.6 per cent of the Swedish average wage (OECD [2008]).
Table 7.14 provides moments from our first counterfactual experiment when there is no
grandparent-provided child care available, together with the corresponding moments from
our benchmark economy. In the benchmark economy, women face high child care costs
in Far and the main reason for not moving away is the access to free child care in Home.
When women no longer have access to free child care, the incentive to remain close dis-
appears and thus we observe an increase of 2 percentage points in the share of women
moving away with respect to the benchmark economy. Women who remain close either
received better ’life-course offer’ in ’Home’ or they cannot afford to pay for child care and
thus do not participate in the labor market. Hence, labor force participation of mothers
who remain close decreases and only 9% of young mothers with small children and 31%
of middle-aged mothers with small children work. Meanwhile, the percentage of mothers
living away who participate in the labor market increases with respect to our benchmark
economy. Around 38% of young mothers living far away work, while the fraction of work-
ing middle-aged mothers is 48%. This rise in labor force participation rates in Far is due
to more working mothers moving away in order to obtain higher wage rates given that
they face the same child care costs in both regions. Hence, as grandparent-provided child
care becomes unavailable labor force participation rates of mothers who remain close drop
while rates for those far away increase. On the aggregate, labor market participation by
women drops by 9 percentage points compared to our benchmark economy. Moreover,
having no access to grandparent-provided child care also affects women’s fertility deci-
sions. We observe a slight decrease in the average fertility rate, 1.18 compared to the
benchmark economy, 1.24.
32Individuals’ increasing life expectancy and better health might counteract the problem of late first
child birth. However, this increased life expectancy is again likely to lead to successive increases in
retirement age.
33See the Introduction 1 for a review of this literature.
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Table 7.14: No Grand-parent provided child care
No Benchmark
grandparents economy
Fertility rate 1.18 1.24
Labor force participation of married women 40.01 49.00
LFP rate of young mothers with small children, close 9.00 50.68
LFP rate of young mothers with small children, far 38.00 31.71
LFP rate of middle mothers with small children, close 31.01 54.68
LFP rate of middle mothers with small children, far 48.00 43.90
share of population moving away 48.62 46.82
In our second counterfactual experiment we consider an increase in child care subsidies
that is government consumption neutral. Hence, the amount of tax revenues collected
used for government consumption remains the same as in our benchmark economy and as
child care subsidies are financed via labor income taxes, this policy might imply higher tax
rates. In particular we consider a policy that subsidizes 50% of child care costs, the policy
parameter ω is set equal to 0.5. Table 7.15 displays moments from this counterfactual
experiment, next to moments of our benchmark economy where child care subsidies are
zero. As more women can now afford child care costs in ’Far’, more decide to move.
Compared to our benchmark economy, the percentage of women moving away increases by
5 percentage points. As a result of the increased labor mobility, the percentage of mothers,
both young and middle aged, participating in the labor market in ’Home’ drops, while
there is an increase in the participation rate of mothers in ’Far’. However, the aggregate
employment rate of women does not change. Still 49% of married women participate in
the labor market. This result is consistent with findings in the literature that argue that
child care subsidies might not affect maternal employment but simply induce a shift from
informal child care to formal child care, see Havnes and Mogstad [2011]. The aggregate
fertility rate increases slightly under this policy. Women who move away now face lower
child care costs and so it is cheaper for them to have children while women who remain
close face zero costs of child care as before.
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Table 7.15: Child care subsidized, ω = 0.5
Benchmark
ω = 0.5 economy
Fertility rate 1.28 1.24
Labor force participation of married women 49.00 49.00
LFP rate of young mothers with small children, close 41.55 50.68
LFP rate of young mothers with small children, far 51.18 31.71
LFP rate of middle-aged mothers with small children, close 46.82 54.68
LFP rate of middle-aged mothers with children, far 53.00 43.90
share of population moving away 51.36 46.82
8 Conclusion
In this paper we document benefits and costs of grandparent-provided child care. Looking
at German data we find that women residing close to parents or in-laws are more likely
to have children and mothers are more likely to hold a regular full-or part time job. How-
ever, we find that their wages are lower and they are more likely to incur daily commutes.
We build a general equilibrium model of residence choice, fertility decisions, and female
labor force participation to account for this trade-off. We simulate the model to match
the German economy in terms of fertility, women’s labor force participation, and along
other dimensions related to time spent with children and expenditures made on children.
We then perform two counterfactual experiments to analyze how women’s decisions on
residence, fertility, and labor force participation change under distinct scenarios regarding
availability of grandparent-provided child care and different family policies. We find that
if there is no grandparent-provided child care, there are fewer women participating in the
labor market and fertility decreases. We also show that subsidizing 50% of child care costs
does not increase aggregate women’s employment rates with respect to the benchmark
case. However, there is an increase of 5 percentage points in the share of women moving
away and thus labor mobility is increased. In this sense it seems that providing child care
subsidies does not increase women’s labor market participation but rather encourages la-
bor mobility.
In absence of child care subsidies, grandparent-provided child care plays an important role
by allowing women to work. However, grandparent-provided child care imposes spatial
restrictions that limit labor mobility. Women who remain close have access to a smaller
labor market which in turn, might imply worse labor market opportunities and thus lower
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wages. Hence, when designing policies aimed at increasing labor force participation of
mothers policy makers should take into account the wide-spread presence of grandparent-
provided child care as well as the spatial restrictions it implies. For instance, a policy that
subsidizes grandparents’ time does not only affect labor force participation by mothers
but it also has an impact on mothers’ labor mobility and hence their wages.
In this paper we simply assumed that being close to one’s grandparents’ implies that
grandparents take care of their grandchildren and we did not consider grandparents’ de-
cisions to provide or not child care to their grandchildren. However, this decision might
be very related to individuals’ retirement age and especially in the case of grandmothers
to previous decisions about labor force participation. In this sense, opposing forces for
cohort effects of female labor force participation could arise. On the one hand, having a
mother who is actively participating in the labor force could increase chances for women
to also do so, while a negative effect could come from the fact that a grandmother ac-
tively participating in the labor market might be less likely to provide child care for her
grandchild.34 We believe that a further analysis of how late first birth and improved
health after retirement might interact with these aspects is a very interesting road for
future research. Another interesting path for future research could be to consider the
macroeconomic effects of spatial restrictions imposed by grandparent-provided child care
on optimal labor mobility and the optimal allocation of talent.
34See Fernandez et al [2004] and Farre and Vella [2007] on the intergenerational transmission of attitude
towards the role of women in the economy and its effect on female labor force participation.
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A Appendix
Figure A-1: Frequency of Care and Distance to Closest Grandchild Age 10 and Younger
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Data: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), 2nd wave.
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Figure A-2: Frequency of Care and Distance to Closest Grandchild Age 10 and Younger
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Data: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), 2nd wave.
Figure A-3: Frequency of Care and Distance to Closest Grandchild Age 10 and Younger
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Table A.1: Effect of Close Presence of Grandparents on Fertility
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation for Having Children
with Interaction Terms
Married, living together 0.287*** (0.012) 0.287*** (0.012)
Other than German nationality 0.007 (0.027) 0.007 (0.027)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001)
in East Germany 0.152*** (0.008) 0.152*** (0.008)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) -0.102*** (0.013)
Primary/Secondary edu (ISCED: 0-4) 0.102*** (0.013)
Parents or in-laws close 0.033*** (0.010) 0.064*** (0.016)
Parents in-laws close*Tert edu 0.031* (0.017)
Parents in-laws close*Non-Tert edu -0.033* (0.020)
Parents or in-laws in same house 0.001 (0.013) 0.001 (0.013)
Small community 0.029*** (0.010) 0.029*** (0.010)
Large community -0.060*** (0.012) -0.060*** (0.012)
Observations 10,732 10,732
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,* p<0.1 Data: GSOEP
unbalanced panel 91,96,01,06; Women 25-50. All regressions include year dummies and age group dummies. Reference group:
unmarried women age 25-29 living in West Germany in 1991, in a medium-sized town, far from parents or in-laws.
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Table A.2: Effect of Close Presence of Grandparents on Fertility
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation for Having Children
without Variables Posing a Possible Endogeneity Problem: Marital Status and Income
of Spouse
Other than German nationality 0.030 (0.025)
in East Germany 0.140*** (0.008)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) -0.089*** (0.010)
Parents or in-laws close 0.062*** (0.009)
Parents or in-laws in same house 0.018 (0.012)
Small community 0.043*** (0.010)
Large community -0.089*** (0.012)
Observations 10,732
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel
91,96,01,06; Women 25-50. All regressions include year dummies and age group dummies. Reference
group: women age 25-29 living in West Germany with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED:0-4) in 1991,
in a medium-sized town, far from parents or in-laws.
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Table A.3: Proximity of Adult Parents and Effects on Participation by Non-Mothers
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation for Labor Force Participation of (1) Men and
(2) Single Childless Women
Regular Part or Regular Part or
Fulltime Job Fulltime Job
(1) (2)
Married, living together 0.106*** (0.008)
Other than German nationality -0.088*** (0.032) -0.099 (0.070)
in East Germany -0.095*** (0.009) -0.045 (0.036)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.090*** (0.006) 0.122*** (0.024)
Parents or in-laws close 0.007 (0.007) 0.029 (0.027)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.007 (0.010) -0.094*** (0.036)
Small community 0.011 (0.008) -0.030 (0.035)
Large community -0.014 (-0.009) -0.106*** (0.031)
Observations 8,653 1,191
Standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel 1) 91,96,01,06; Men 25-50.
Reference group: unmarried men age 25-29 with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized town in
West Germany, far from parents or in-laws 2)91,96,01,06; single childless women (25-50). Reference group: single
childless women age 25-29 in 1991, with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4), in a medium-sized town in West Germany.
All regressions include year dummies and age group dummies.
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Table A.4: Effect of Grandparent-Provided Child Care on Participation
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation for Mothers’ Labor Force Participation without
Variables Posing a Possible Endogeneity Problem: (1): Marital Status and Income of
Spouse and (2): Children in Nursery
Regular Part or Regular Part or
Fulltime Job Fulltime Job
(1) (2)
Children 0-3 -0.376*** (0.015)
Married, living together -0.052*** (0.020)
Other than German nationality -0.140*** (0.053) -0.072** (0.031)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.004* (0.002)
in East Germany 0.135*** (0.013) 0.127*** (0.020)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.169*** (0.013) 0.083*** (0.017)
Parents or in-laws close 0.024* (0.013)
Parents or in-laws in same house 0.026 (0.018)
Children cared for
by relatives 0.161*** (0.016)
Small community -0.009 (0.014) -0.013 (0.017)
Large community 0.023 (0.016) 0.032 (0.019)
Observations 8,129 3,390
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Probit
Estimation; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel 1) 91,96,01,06; Mothers 25-50. Reference group: unmarried mothers age
25-29 with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized town in West Germany, far from parents
or in-laws with children older than 3. 2) 97,99,00,01,02,03,05,06; mothers (25-50) of children <= 3. Reference
group: unmarried mothers age 25-29 in 1997, with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4), in a medium-sized town in
West Germany, with children who are not cared for by relatives. All regressions include year dummies
and age group dummies.
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Table A.5: Effect of Close Presence of Grandparents on Monthly Wages
Coefficients of Heckman Selection Model for Mothers’ Log Monthly Wages
Log hourly Selection
wage Equation
(1) (2)
Married, living together -0.047*** (0.017) -0.352*** (0.044)
Other than German nationality -0.111 (0.084) 0.320** (0.138)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.284*** (0.016) 0.445*** (0.036)
Parents or in-laws close -0.058*** (0.015) 0.073** (0.032)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.059*** (0.022) 0.084* (0.047)
Small community -0.029* (0.017) -0.012 (0.036)
Large community 0.063*** (0.019) 0.044 (0.041)
in East Germany -0.162*** (0.018) 0.320*** (0.035)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.017*** (0.005)
Children 0-3 -0.993*** (0.044)
Tenure in firm 0.017*** (0.001)
Monthly hours worked 0.008*** (0.000)
Constant 5.693*** (0.052) 0.053 (0.080)
Observations 8,129 8,129
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data: GSOEP
unbalanced panel 91,96,01,06; mothers 25-50. Reference group: unmarried mothers of age 25-29 of children older than 3
with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized West German town, far from parents or in-laws.
All regressions include age group dummies and year dummies.
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Table A.6: Effect of Close Presence of Grandparents on Hourly Wages
Coefficients of OLS Estimation of Mothers’ Log Hourly Wages
Married, living together -0.006 (0.015)
Other than German nationality -0.112 (0.078)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.279*** (0.014)
Tenure in firm 0.016*** (0.001)
Parents or in-laws close -0.055*** (0.014)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.055*** (0.020)
Small community -0.032** (0.016)
Large community 0.055*** (0.018)
in East Germany -0.224*** (0.014)
Constant 1.926*** (0.037)
Observations 4,348
R-squared 0.251
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 OLS Estimation; Data:
GSOEP unbalanced panel 91,96,01,06; mothers 25-50 with full-or part time regular job.
All regressions include age group dummies and year dummies Reference group: unmarried
women age 25-29 living in West Germany, with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4),
in 1991, in a medium-sized town, far from parents or in-laws.
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Table A.7: Effect of Close Presence of Grandparents on Hourly Wages
Coefficients of Heckman Selection Model for Mothers’ Log Hourly Wages without
Variables Posing a Possible Endogeneity Problem: Marital Status and Income of Spouse
Log hourly Selection
wage Equation
(1) (2)
Other than German nationality -0.132* (0.078) -0.353*** (0.137)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.296*** (0.015) 0.436*** (0.036)
Parents or in-laws close -0.051*** (0.014) 0.059*** (0.032)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.052** (0.021) 0.064 (0.047)
Small community -0.032** (0.016) -0.022 (0.036)
Large community 0.058*** (0.018) 0.057 (0.041)
in East Germany -0.204*** (0.015) 0.343*** (0.035)
Children 0-3 -1.006*** (0.044)
Tenure in firm 0.016*** (0.001)
Constant 1.815*** (0.046) -0.088 (0.075)
Observations 8,129 8,129
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Heckman Selection Model; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel
91,96,01,06; mothers 25-50. Reference group: mothers of age 25-29 of children older than 3 living in West Germany,
with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized West German town, far from parents or in-laws.
All regressions include age group dummies and year dummies.
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Table A.8: Effect of Grandparent-Provided Child Care on Commutes
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation of Working and Residing in Same Town
without Variable Posing a Possible Endogeneity Problem: Children in Nursery
Married, living together -0.117** (0.048)
Other than German nationality 0.520*** (0.096)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.012 (0.008)
in East Germany 0.140*** (0.008)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) -0.020 (0.044)
Tenure in firm 0.004 (0.004)
Children cared for by relatives -0.118*** (0.040)
Small community -0.270*** (0.045)
Large community 0.261*** (0.053)
in East Germany 0.088* (0.047)
Observations 690
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel 97,99,00,01,02,03,05,06;
mothers 25-50 of children ≤ 3. All regressions include year dummies and age group dummies. Reference
group: unmarried mothers age 25-29 in 1997 living in West Germany with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED:0-4) in 1991,
in a medium-sized town, far from parents or in-laws, with children who are not in nursery, nor cared for by relatives.
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